After writing (ad nauseum) last
week about developments in the Eurozone, we return to the status of the U.S.
economic recovery, which, it can be argued, is a liberal use of the term recovery. Where are we? Is the economy
expanding, stalling or (heavens!) settling into a malaise-inducing new normal? These are questions on the
forefront of the minds of investors, consumers, business leaders and policy
makers. Usually, 11 quarters after the minds at the NBER call an end to a
recession, the economy is racking up impressive data flow. Although there have
been a few strong numbers registered in certain pockets (e.g. exports),
momentum has repeatedly tapered off. Further clouding the picture is the origin
of the recession (a housing bust), which usually takes longer to find a floor
than a run-of-the-mill excess-inventory and rate-hike driven recession. Distortions
rattling around financial markets and the real economy due to unprecedented
policy responses meant to combat such a deep and long-lasting slowdown only add
to the uncertainty. Results of initiatives such as cash for clunkers, first-time
home-buyer tax exemptions and others, have pulled forward certain activities
like home and auto purchases, robbing growth from future quarters. At the same
time the Fed’s rock-bottom interest rates have pushed investors into higher
yielding corners of financial markets, potentially creating asset bubbles
disconnected from valuation fundamentals.
The uncertainty about our location in the
business cycle complicates the planning of corporations considering ramping up
capital expenditure and hiring, investors when determining which asset classes
and sectors in which to rotate, and consumers as they consider their future
earning power before opening up the purse strings. Competing interpretations
the economy’s position and future prospects will likely monopolize the airwaves
over the coming months in advance of November’s pivotal election.
It’s physics….well not really.
Basic physics teaches us that every
action has an equal but opposite reaction. While hardly applicable to a
behavioral science such as economics, when it comes to recessions and ensuing
recoveries, the principal roughly applies. Deep recessions are usually marked
by equally robust periods of expansion. The rationale is fairly simple. As
economies slow and credit contracts, companies and consumers, in face of the
unknown, put off purchases. Eventually…usually after interest rates fall in
order to spur investment…this pent up demand is unleashed. Overused factory equipment is
replaced and consumers, sick of donning threadbare socks and driving cars held
together by duct tape, hit the malls. Over the past two decades…roughly the
period described by Alan Greenspan as the
great moderation…recessions have been shallow and recoveries equally
temperate, but predictable. Not so this time around. As seen in the chart
below, in the 11 quarters since the recession was nominally called over, growth
has averaged 2.4 %. After the ’91
recession, quarterly GDP growth (annualized) averaged 3.1% over the next 11
quarters. Post 2001 recession, it registered 2.9%. The mirror-image trajectory
premise has not panned out this time around. Theories as to why abound. Two
obvious culprits are the continued deleveraging of the consumer, which is further
magnified by the tighter credit conditions extended to them as well as to the
small-business growth engine of the economy. Regulatory uncertainty, potential
repercussions of the Fed’s easy monetary policy, and the much harped about 2013 fiscal cliff, have also likely
played roles.
Getting off-course
The ability of an economy to make
up for lost ground post-recession has resulted in the establishment of a fairly
consistent pattern of GDP growth. This is illustrated by the trend-line in the
chart below. When a deviation from the trend occurs (i.e. a recession), it can
be followed by one of three possible outcomes. As explained in the section
above, the economy can play catch-up by experiencing a period of above average
growth. The result is the trend being maintained. A second scenario is the eventual return to
long-term growth rates, but without the initial period of excessive growth
driven by pent-up demand. Although long-term rates are maintained, the economy
tracks below the established trend-line, resulting in a steady gap between
current growth and the lost potential of the earlier trajectory. We’ll call this the what might have been scenario. The final possibility is no period
of initial excessive growth coupled with the establishment of a new, lower
growth rate. Here the divergence between the original trend and new trajectory
continues to widen. Although maybe not as cataclysmic as the Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire, this scenario could be used to describe the slowing of
western Europe’s economy after its post-World War II multi-decade economic
miracle.
During America’s recent great moderation, deviations from the
trend were minor. It does not take a Nobel Prize winner in economics to notice
something is awry with the current gap (see chart). If either of the two latter
scenarios plays out, the result could be trillions of dollars of lost
production over the next few decades. Possible consequences of this include
even weaker wage growth than present, a lower standard of living, lower corporate
earnings and thus weaker performance by financial markets.
Another concept along similar
lines is that of an economy’s output gap. This is the difference between the
pace at which the economy is running and its optimal output. Divining what
actually is the optimal output is complicated and there are various competing
models. The chart below is based on IMF assumptions, but likely other models,
such as that of the Congressional Budget Office, show similar results. When the
economy is running close to maximum output, resources are being used
efficiently and there is little spare capacity. Should the economy overheat and
growth exceed the optimal level, demand for finite resources (labor and
materials) will increase price pressures and excess production may eventually
result in a glut of goods, thus spurring an inventory-driven slowdown.
That is not the case presently. Slow
GDP growth means that the U.S. has plenty of room to expand before its economy
is anywhere close to overheating. This is relevant today for two major reasons.
Limited pricing pressure from inputs (now that the 2011 energy spike due to the
Arab Spring has subsided) and substantial idle capacity means that the Fed
believes it has maneuvering room to launch another round of quantitative easing
to spur growth….since the first two rounds worked so well….without unleashing
inflationary pressure. The other reason why the large output gap matters is
that much of that idle capacity is in the form of displaced workers.
The Jobs Picture (Another Maalox Moment)
As alarming as the previous
charts are, the one below is really the gut-wrencher as it concerns the livelihoods
of American workers….millions of them. When the term jobless recovery entered the vernacular a few decades back, it was
referred to as an annoyance, such as the common cold: uncomfortable for a
while, then gradually going away. Now it
is more akin to a debilitating illness, defying all known treatment. At its
nadir, the U.S. economy had shed over 8.4 million jobs. Since the beginning of
2010, it has clawed back only 3.7 million of them. The rule-of-thumb is that the economy must add
125,000 to 150,000 jobs per month just to keep up with population growth. Using
the north end of that range, it would take 33 months for the U.S. to winnow
away the remaining five million jobs that were lost during the recession. Using
the average payroll gain recorded since the beginning of 2010 (115k/month), it
would take 44 months.
Other employment data are equally nauseating.
The unemployment rate stands at 8.2%, but that is partly a consequence of the
labor force having dwindled to levels not seen since 1983. The labor force
participation rate currently stands at 63.8%, down from a pre-crisis level of
66.8%. Should so many workers not have left the labor market, the unemployment
rate would be well north of 10%. Another
measure of the underutilized workforce is the U-6 rate, which combines the
unemployed along with those marginally attached to the workforce (e.g.
part-timers who’d prefer a steadier gig). That number has dipped from a crisis
high of 17.2% to 14.8%, but still well above the 18-year average of 10.3%. And
maybe most troubling is the duration of unemployment. Of those unemployed,
nearly 43% have been out of a job for 27 weeks or longer, twice the long-term
average. Again referring to Mr. Greenspan, the former Fed Chairman postulates
that overall economic potential is diminished as idled workers’ skills atrophy,
motivation is lost, earning power is weakened and many drop out of the
workforce permanently, often choosing to apply for long-term disability
benefits or live off savings…which have been battered (refer to last week’s Fed
report that shows the net worth of the American household has taken a 39% hit
over the past few years).
Given that consumer spending
accounts for 70% of the U.S. economy, the fact that so many Americans are
either officially unemployed (thus
counted as such), marginally employed or have left the labor market entirely,
any chance of a robust consumer-driven rebound is diminished. Such a predicament is manifested in various
consumer surveys. Although one may dismiss such reports as soft data and
instead cast his attention to durable goods orders or the sports page, sentiment
actually matters. A glum population, unsure of their future employment status,
with dramatically lower net worth and lack of access to credit, is not likely
to ramp up purchases anytime soon. Other
headline risk such as fights over budget ceilings, government debt and
regulatory uncertainty only add to the apprehension. The Consumer Sentiment Survey below shows that
although attitudes have recently risen from their crisis lows, at 79.3, the May
reading is still well below the long term average.
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