When scanning business headlines
over the past week, two items of relevance were the lowering of key lending
rates by the Chinese Central Bank (PBOC) in an attempt to counteract the
country’s slowing growth, and the decline of two major emerging market
currencies: India’s Rupee and the Brazilian Real. These stories serve as a
reminder that there are themes of consequence moving markets other than the
chronic Eurozone debt crisis. Then again, in the interconnected global economy,
these are linked given that Europe is China’s largest export market and, lest
we forget, it was growth from key emerging markets that buttressed the world
economy during the depths of the (developed markets induced) financial crisis
and ensuing recession.
And so with this segue, we make
our initial foray into the subject of emerging markets (EM). As the subject is clearly
too broad to attack in one entry, the focus of this pass will be from an
investment perspective. We’ll save for another day an examination of EM’s impact
on the real economy, including the
effect that Asia’s cheap labor force had on developed market prices (it kept a
lid on them) and the influence these countries’ hunger for U.S. fixed income
instruments had on lending rates, including those for mortgages (it…among other
factors…contributed to downward pressure on them). And we know what that led
to.
Where’s the Growth? Found it!
Historically investing in
developing economies was fraught with risk and thus was relegated to a small
allocation of institutional investors’ portfolios. Over the past two decades,
though, these markets have adapted rules leading to increased transparency and
stronger investor protection. Financial
market reforms have coincided with broader economic initiatives that have
catalyzed growth in several previously struggling regions. And it is that
reason…growth…that is perhaps the most compelling motivation for investors to
consider exposure to EMs. Over the past ten years, annual GDP in the Eurozone
and the U.S. has averaged 1.1% and 1.6%, respectively. During the same period, EMs
have grown at a 6.5% annual clip. Over time, corporate earnings tend to track
GDP growth. With advanced economies stuck in low gear, money managers must seek
higher yielding investments. As seen in the chart below, over the same 10-year
period, robust EM output has been reflected in equity returns, with the broad
MSCI EM index far outpacing advanced economies and not taking the beating that
the more established markets did during the depths of the financial crisis.
Historically this had not been
the case. As the investor’s adage goes: “when America sneezes, the rest of the
world catches a cold.” Put another way, given the dominance of the U.S.
economy, when it slows, all other regions are negatively impacted, including
financial markets, which see investors run from anything considered a high-risk
investment. This brings up another common phrase: “in a crisis, the only thing
that rises is correlation.” EMs relatively good performance during the recent
turmoil is attributable to the fact that the crisis started in America and that
many emerging countries had sufficient firepower to make up for diminished
export demand by funding stimulus initiatives such as infrastructure projects
and favorable tax treatment of domestic consumption like durable goods purchases.
The disparity in growth between
emerging and advanced economies is expected to continue in decades to come. A
recent study by Goldman Sachs estimated that over the next 20 years, annual GDP
growth in emerging markets will average 6.7% while developed markets tread
water at 1.8%. The same report projects at the market capitalization of
emerging markets to grow at an annual clip of 9.3% over this period as
developed markets’ equity capitalization will rise by only 4% annually (CAGR).
The rapid growth in EM market cap will be partly attributable to appreciation
while the remainder is a product of new issuance as these regions
(theoretically) cut back on state-control of industry (something Greece should
take to heart) and entrepreneurial enterprises gain a foothold. The expected
divergence between EM and DM growth rates has significant ramifications for
investors, such as pension funds, who must achieve a minimum rate of return to
meet future obligations. Already institutional investors are dialing up their
allocation to high-growth markets. Eventually other pools of capital, including
high net worth individuals (already somewhat a factor in EM investing) and even
broader retail investors will have to design ways to gain exposure to these
regions if they want to enjoy the returns that developed markets had previously
been able to deliver.
Impressive EM growth rates are
not occurring by accident. A key driver is superior demographics. These are
already large markets with rapidly growing populations, especially when
compared to certain advanced economies like Japan and Western Europe. Not only
are populations surging, they are also, for the first time, becoming
increasingly urban and joining the middle class. This ties into a favored investment
theme of increased EM domestic consumption for everything from higher protein
diets and automobiles to creature comforts like home appliances, electronics
and travel. Just under one half of China’s population are urban dwellers and
personal consumption accounts for less than 40% of GDP (compared to 70% for the
U.S.). Both of these figures are expected to rise in coming years. Other growth
drivers include improving workforce productivity, the manufacture of higher
margin, value-added goods (where do you think the beloved iPhone is made?) and
an increasing use of leverage in the corporate sector to goose return on
equity.
Not All EMs Created Equally
Not all of the aforementioned drivers
are occurring in each county, nor are they progressing at the same pace.
Emerging markets are a heterogeneous group. Often hot investment themes are applied with a broad brush, and slick
marketing by purveyors of investment products doesn’t do justice to the nuances
present in specific markets. In addition to varying levels of key EM drivers,
markets also differ on issues like transparency, liquidity, the role of the
state (as regulator or majority shareholder in key industries), taxation,
shareholder/property rights, etc. Historically these potential red flags are
the reasons why EM investments have commanded substantial risk premiums
vis-à-vis advanced economies.
The headliner of EM investing has
been the so-called BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, & China) countries. More
than just a marketing slogan by Goldman Sachs, which coined the term, these
countries have been lumped together due to their large populations (including
the world’s two largest countries) and impressive growth rates. But even within
this group there is significant variation that warrants investor scrutiny. Two
are democracies. Two are totalitarian (a fact that the Kremlin barely even
attempts to conceal now). Two are export juggernauts, with Russia pumping out
energy products and Brazil being a world leader in agricultural exports as well
as iron ore. And two have been successful in leveraging their low cost (and
increasingly higher skilled) workforces to fuel their rise to the top league of
global players.
With the BRICs having been on
investors’ radars for the past decade, attention has moved to other countries
which show similar promise. Goldman hatched a new moniker called the Next 11 (N-11), an attempt to categorize
a group even more varied than the BRICS. Other firms push exposure to the
nebulous sounding Frontier Markets.
Given the first word’s association with the wild west, these are likely opaque
as mud and whose main participants are cronies of the ruling junta looking to
monetize ill-gotten enterprises by pawning them off on foreign investors who
did not do their homework. And yes,
there are plenty of investors who fit that description: namely ones who were
kicking themselves for missing out on the initial phase of BRIC and Central
European growth and wanted to get into the EM game regardless of the
destination. Lesson: do your due diligence.
This is not to say that the
ripest fruit on the EM tree has been picked. As with any asset class, there are
fluctuations, which present attractive entry levels. As noted earlier, India’s
main index is 8% off its 52-week high, while Brazil’s market is down 18%. The
sour mood is reflected in each of these countries’ respective currencies being
over 20% off recent peaks. The table below highlights what makes the BRICS
attractive. It also includes other large emerging markets that are not far
behind. In addition to favorable growth rates and government finances, many of
the countries run current account surpluses (or small deficits) thanks to
robust exports. On the flipside, the albatross of elevated inflation often
accompanies rapid economic growth. Inflation is not an investor’s friend,
especially in markets where central banks have historically failed to
effectively manage price levels.
Early in the last decade, EM
investing was left to sophisticated institutional investors and specialized
funds. Impressive economic and investment performance broadened their appeal,
and avenues in which to gain exposure increased. Many investors were attracted
by the concept of decoupling, meaning
that EMs had reached a self-sustaining level of growth (thanks to domestic
consumption, infrastructure spending and piles of foreign reserves) to weather
a recession emanating from developed markets. Alas that was not the case as the
depth of the crisis sent shockwaves throughout the global economy. Although growth
in EMs was not as hammered as that in advance economies, their financial
markets saw severe drops as investors shed any asset with a hint of risk. As a consequence, EMs still caught a cold from
America. Now that the dust has settled,
as evidenced by consistent flows into international equity funds (at the
expense of U.S. equities), investors are returning. Several lessons have been
learned in the interim. Given the uniqueness of individual markets, investors
can no longer apply the top-down brush.
Instead they must conduct granular bottom-up
analysis to identify the specific regions…and enterprises…that offer the most
attractive risk-adjusted returns. Investors must take heed of yet another maxim
(we have many of them), which is “never pay for beta.” All of these markets are
growing. One need not pay elevated expenses to access general market growth. Reserve
the fees for funds that have a track record of delivering returns in excess of
markets. Historically, EMs have been fertile ground of uncovering such returns,
but as a great number of investors cast an eye towards them, those
opportunities naturally diminish.
This page is not in the business
of parceling investment advice. It is sufficient to say that in the future
there will be a growing assortment of choices to gain exposure to EM-related
themes. In addition to funds investing directly into foreign markets, investors
can choose U.S.-listed American Depository Receipts (ADRs) of some of the
emerging world’s blue chip companies. By the week, the choices of ETFs seem to
grow. And advanced-economy investors have the added benefit of investing
directly into domestic firms that derive a significant amount of their revenues
from EM customers. Chinese manufacturers require U.S. made machinery and
specialized software. EM consumers aspire to buy Volkswagens and Toyotas (many
of which are assembled in EMs), not to mention much sought-after European
luxury goods. As slow developed market growth forces investors to seek
alternative sources of sufficient yields, emerging financial markets will be
forced to improve their regulatory framework, transparency and legal
protections. This in turn should contribute to great volume and liquidity in
these markets, which as a consequence, should lower volatility, yet another
historical bugaboo of EM investing.
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